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THE EMPTY TOMB: POST-CRITICAL
LEGAL HERMENEUTICS
Peter Goodrich*
There is nothing more refreshing than a successful failure. A momentary
flaring of flamboyance. A near miss. Fifteen weeks as media monarchs; a
good part—a small part—of a decade as a political threat to the order of the
academy, if not the stability of the system. The affective bonds and the institutional disruption of youthful and latterly not-so-young dissidents and socialist
sympathizers within the law schools definitely had their excitements, their
impetus and novelties, and then they grew old, got rejected, disappeared into
the shadows, backrooms, and faculty lounges. The various histories assign different figures to the failure of critical legal studies (CLS) in the U.S. of A.: it
was killed by the lack of a positive program; it went underground and still
subsists as interstitial trench warfare; it slept with the enemy, got distracted by
the status incentives and glittering prizes of the law professoriat; it was undermined by its own poor scholarship, by the pretention of philosophy; it fragmented into forty different movements; it was undone by a predilection for
abstraction and consequent waning of its visceral commitments. I could think
of plenty of other post-mortem descriptive vivisections, but that list will do.
Add to it as you wish. This Article will focus on the last interpretation, the
decline of critique in law due to its tendency to academicism, a propensity to
adiaphorism or indifference to doctrine, which is an essentially hermeneutic
diagnosis of an affective inability.1
One of the founding brothers of the U.S. critical legal movement, Peter
Gabel, left conventional law teaching early on to become an activist and administrator. On reflection, a quarter of a century later, youth in the rear view mirror, Gabel sees the decline of radical politics in law, and specifically the all too
sudden stasis of the critical legal movement, as a consequence of psychological
and spiritual weaknesses. It is true that the movement ran into a wall—the
tenure wars, the threat of institutional exile, in a word law professors—but that
was only the symptom, the obvious reason for deceleration. Walls, after all,
can and have come down. The root cause was an interior weakness to the
collectivity, an affective incapacity, and so, in the end, a failure of desire—
* Professor of Law and Director of the Program in Law and Humanities, Cardozo School of
Law.
1 See Peter Gabel, Critical Legal Studies as a Spiritual Practice, 36 PEPP. L. REV. 515
(2009). I should note here that the relevant referent of post-critical is local and contemporary, namely post-critical legal studies, the movement having been the source of a brief
revival of the legal hermeneutic tradition in the United States that goes back at least to
FRANCIS LIEBER, LEGAL AND POLITICAL HERMENEUTICS, OR PRINCIPLES OF INTERPRETATION
AND CONSTRUCTION IN LAW AND POLITICS, WITH REMARKS ON PRECEDENTS AND AUTHORITIES (Boston, Charles C. Little & James Brown 1839), but which was mainly a reflection of
the so-called linguistic turn in social theory.
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optimism of the intellect but pessimism of the will. In Gabel’s view, it was not
only that the established order resisted or rejected the critics, but equally that
the bonds between the dissidents, the sense of collective urgency and mutual
affirmation, fell away. The existential goal of the movement was to build a
community, to connect, to bond, to share affections and affirm ideas, to love,
but these embodied and interpersonal attributes of collective encounter, “the
whirl of the spiral dance” and of “eye contact” too soon became sedimented in
“reciprocal withdrawnness” and “mutual solitude.”2 The system gets to you,
memory shapes community and experience dampens relationships, all too often
placing habitus and impetus alike in the past, in the origin, in that childhood,
institutional, existential or both, in which we were all sovereigns of our
restricted worlds. Now, in the desert of the real, the corporate wasteland as
reflected in the mirror of law school grade curves, classroom hazing, and doctrinal vacuities, separation and alienation have, in Gabel’s view, left the heart
beating weakly. A seemingly bleak picture. The hermeneutics of habitus, the
ethos of the movement as a political community, gives way to the theory of
critique, a movement towards abstraction that reflects the normative impetus of
law, as well as a demographic that does not include successful reproduction of
the movement in the next generations. Thus, the repetitive sense of fading
away, the detachment from the viscera, a necessary though not necessarily
desirable aging and separation, from movement to perambulation, reflective, if
nothing else, of the success and institutionalization of the participants. They
became named chairs, spouses, parents, professors of general jurisprudence,
poets, film-makers, Associate Dean.
Gabel, however, is affirmatively optimistic: “But it’s not too late!” Community survives, there is time and place for play, connection still. The way out
or, better, the way forward for CLS is “to return to its original instincts as a
righteous social transformation movement and this time recognize that there is
a spiritual basis for our understanding of the social individual that is rooted . . .
in the enlivening mutual recognition, or Love, that was always at the heart of
the movement out of which CLS was born.”3 The failure of critical legal studies, the hiatus or temporary derailing thus offers a dynamic lesson and sounds a
rallying cry. Post-critical legal hermeneutics should return to the early writings
and recover the breath of enthusiasm, the light of shared excitement, the ideals
of justice and love that the nascent movement of critique had conjured and that
subsequently, with mainly benign collective senescence, got mislaid. It is this
argument as to the lost object of critique, the forgotten core, and its accompanying interpretative theory that is a new project born of old texts. It touches a
chord, a song not yet sung, that is also emergent in the margins of European
legal studies and gains surprising support in the work of the Italian jurist and
philosopher Giorgio Agamben.4
2

Gabel, supra note 1, at 522.
Id. at 529.
4 I will focus primarily on three texts: GIORGIO AGAMBEN, WHAT IS AN APPARATUS?
(David Kishik & Stefan Pedatella trans., Stanford Univ. Press 2009) (2006); GIORGIO
AGAMBEN, LE RÈGNE ET LA GLOIRE: POUR UNE GÉNÉALOGIE THÉOLOGIQUE DE L’ÉCONOMIE
ET DU GOUVERNEMENT (2008) [hereinafter AGAMBEN, LE RÈGNE]; and THANOS
ZARTALOUDIS, AGAMBEN: POWER, LAW AND THE USES OF CRITICISM (2010).
3
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The argument that I will pursue is an intricate and, dare I say it, old world
variation on Gabel’s observations. In terms of the history of ideas, the spirituality of law and of critique is a return of political theology. On one side of that
history and doctrine is the theory of law as a holy heritage, a transcendental
hierarchy ordained by the divinity, ensconced in the Church and the ecclesiastical polity. Law is here the public and visible representation of the will of an
absent source (deus absconditus), be it divinity or sovereignty, in whose name
the law speaks in the mouths of its unhappy, waiting subjects—vicarious institutional beings all. The categories of political life are borrowings or, in
Agamben’s terminology, signatures of their generally secreted and forgotten
theological sources. In this account, the legal is public and visible, vicarious
but expressed and known through its theatrical or properly liturgical rites, the
public monuments and other grand statements of the increasingly spectacular
and ever more visiocratic public sphere.
But what if the ostensive and obvious realm of great men, of heroines and
heroic lives, of massive tomes and their black letter laws was only a part of the
story—and a misleading part at that? Put differently, the theater of public
events, of great trials and tabular laws, the codes and columns, books, libraries,
and promulgations could well be a misdirection, a partial truth, texts that conceal much more than they reveal, documents and instruments that distract and
preoccupy as much as they enliven or embrace the reality of governance and
the viscera of practice. Agamben’s thesis is precisely that: the domain of
ostensive sovereignty, triumphal events, and visible declamation of laws is to
be understood literally, that is as a properly transcendent and, in the main, antinomically connected to the forgotten theology, as Agamben relays it, of
“oeconomic” disposition, which in the Latin is also sometimes termed the flowers of law—flores legum.5 The triumphal and acclamatory occasions of promulgation are necessary but distinct from the practices of administration and
the quotidian reality of governance, which in an old adage declares “I observe
but I do not obey”. His treatise thus devolves around the baroque maxim rex
regnat sed non gubernat, meaning that the king rules but does not govern.
The sovereign, who, at least since Hobbes, embodies an unsurpassable
power, is the inheritor of a publicly proclaimed theater of justice and law that
directly embodies the political theology of divine rule.6 The secular figurehead, the delegate of divinity, thus plays an iconic role, makes grand statements, declares, promulgates, heralds, warns, prohibits, and announces, but
5 It is interesting to note here that oikonomia and flores legum were used interchangeably,
both meaning collection and ordering of laws and specifically of signs, the titles being used
for early law dictionaries that followed Book 50 of the Digest, de verborum significatione.
See SOARES DE RIBEIRA, OIKONOMIA, SEU DISPOSITIO REGULARUM UTRISUQUE IURIS IN
LOCOS COMMUNES (Cologne 1570); THOMAS DE THOMASETTIS, FLORES LEGUM CUM SUIS
EXCEPTIONIBUS, & DECLARATIONIBUS: EX VARIIS LEGIBUS, GLOFFIS, & DOCTORIBUS COLLECTIS (Cologne 1657).
6 See ROBERTO ESPOSITO, CATÉGORIES DE L’IMPOLITIQUE (2005) (offers a brief but useful
overview); ERNST H. KANTOROWICZ, THE KING’S TWO BODIES: A STUDY IN MEDIEVAL
POLITICAL THEOLOGY (1957) (provides a trajectory of this argument distinguishing the mystical and natural bodies of the Sovereign); CARL SCHMITT, POLITICAL THEOLOGY (George
Schwab trans., Mass. Inst. of Tech. 1985) (1922) (important for Agamben because of its
political inflections).
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only in a spectacular and distanced way. The world of appearances, of public
stages and media events, is there to be viewed, watched, and screened. It rules
but does not govern. The text of law, in this argument, is the text of rule. As
for governance and the administration of everyday intimacy, the life of relationship and intimate encounter, the spiral dance of social relations and institutional
roles to which Gabel addresses himself7, or alternatively—and less benignly—
the quiet desperation of withdrawal, that is largely another territory, a distinct
text, a different endeavor of a much more specific and affective kind. This
realm of actual governance, the formation of subjects, the organization of visible spaces and faces, and the normative lens of quotidian interaction, I want
now to suggest, is the proper object of post-critical legal hermeneutics and can,
initially at least, form the referent of the current designators of post-critical
legal studies which now and variously, with optimism or cynicism gets named
and renamed diversely as critique 2, governmentality, righteousness, mediation,
law as spiritual practice and, indeed, sublunar legal scholarship as a whole.8
AFFECTIVE MAINTENANCE
I will start with a very basic question and a rather obscure but nonetheless
illustrative text. Following up on the question that Peter Gabel poses in his
attempt to reorient and revitalize critical legal scholarship: how is a community
held together? What makes the group or Church, the flock or fold, the collective sense of custom and use, the inheritance that “we” enter, when “we” go
before the law, which is to say into Kafka’s castle, the institution with its tacit
code and silent norms, with its unwritten laws and its established ways? This is
not only a question of heavy signs, monumental inscriptions, trophies and statues, columns, trials, and other public dramas that exemplify but do not embody
so much as exclude and occlude the interior dimension of governance. The
domain of public expression and visibly inscribed law, of fear, glory, and triumph has its complement, its obverse in the creation and capture of the juridical subject as a legal being, as an oeconomic mode, an administrative site, and
reverent space, let us say, of attachment to law.9 The early modern lawyers
occasionally talked in this sense of common law as a “nursing father,” and
meant by this that the sovereign, Leviathan, was equally also a parent, a father
confessor, and concerned very practically with the cura animarum (care of
souls) which, historically of course, had been more exclusively the province of
7

Gabel, supra note 1, at 522.
Sublunar, let me explain, simply in the sense, European perhaps, that any scholar claims to
be critical, but in the United States legal academy critique has sometimes a reputation of
wildness that requires the sotto voce.
9 2 EDMUND GIBSON, CODEX JURIS ECCLESIASTICI ANGLICANI: OR, THE STATUTES, CONSTITUTIONS, CANONS, RUBRICKS AND ARTICLES OF THE CHURCH OF ENGLAND, METHODICALLY
DIGESTED UNDER THEIR PROPER HEADS. WITH A COMMENTARY, HISTORICAL AND JURIDICAL
ch. X (London, Baskett 1713) (offers detailed collations of the law of persons); JOHN
GODOLPHIN, REPERTORIUM CANONICUM: OR, AN ABRIDGMENT OF THE ECCLESIASTICAL
LAWS OF THIS REALM, CONSISTENT WITH THE TEMPORAL (London, R. & E. Arkins 1687). I
discuss much of this literature in Peter Goodrich, The Theater of Emblems: The Optical
Apparatus and the Investiture of Persons, 6 L., CULTURE & HUMAN. (forthcoming 2011).
8
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the clergy prior to the annexation of their authority and the seizure of their
goods by the state.10
The question then is that of how to attend to the interior attachment to law,
and my initial answer is that this requires recognition of the spaces of affection
and attachment, the love that St. Paul was fond of saying was the completion of
the law. The example I will use briefly is an intriguing early modern Catholic
text by the floridly named Archbishop of Albia in Spain, Hyacinthe Serroni.
The text, Entretiens affectifs de l’ame avec Dieu, is directed to new members
or, more exactly, new converts (rejettons) to the faith and is exemplary both in
sketching the method of induction and in depicting the community.11 The literal translation of the title is Affective Conversations of the Soul with God, but
the hermeneutic sense is probably closer to Affective Maintenance of the Soul
with God. In either version, whether conversing or internally repairing and
maintaining, the Archbishop is aware of the need to institute intimate rites that
will capture and hold the neophytes in their newfound space: “You have
finally become living members of Jesus-Christ . . . you have come back into the
Church in this Holy City where the Lord appears in all his glory
(grandeur) . . . .”12
The space of faith, conceived of as a city, elsewhere termed a house, a
castle, an arsenal, a tower, and a mansion, is evidently one of affect in which
miracles, happiness, admiration, praise, and joy mingle: each new convert is
“our crown.” One aspect of this particularly acute moment of conversion and
entry is obviously the recognition of the glory and greatness, the majesty and
splendor of the divinity ever present in the very structure of the Church. There
is a public, iconic, and heavy symbolic presence and ritualistic utterance of the
divinity and law, an apparatus of appearance that has to be praised and venerated. The other side to this, however, is that this majesty or sheer brilliance is
not a wholly practical technique for engaging and maintaining the necessary
communication, affects, and interior commitments that the Church as collective
body requires. The convert enters into the living body of Christ, becomes a
child of God, and precisely as a child, as a pure emotion, requires affective
tutelage, guidance, and affirmation in the means of membership. The catholic
community is the holy sanctuary writ large. One could usefully look to the
rules of monastic orders to see extreme versions of the rule that Serroni advocates through his annotations and interpretations of the psalms. Indeed, taking
an example that is historically close, within The Rules of St. Benoist (the saint’s
10

The common lawyers did not hesitate to borrow from the Romans and define law as
“knowledge of all divine and humane things.” See, for an important early example, SIR
JOHN DODERIDGE, THE ENGLISH LAWYER: DESCRIBING A METHOD FOR THE MANAGING OF
THE LAWES OF THIS LAND 29 (The Lawbook Exchange, Ltd. 2005) (1631). This borrowed
definition, placed upon the sovereign and all his delegates and viceroys, judges and administers the role of nurture and care of the soul. This spectral jurisdiction, shared with the
Church, is made explicit, for example, in ROGER COKE, JUSTICE VINDICATED FROM THE
FALSE FUCUS PUT UPON IT, BY THOMAS WHITE GENT., MR. THOMAS HOBBS, AND HUGO
GROTIUS 21, 98 (London, Tho. Newcomb 1660), where he addresses common law as a nursing parent.
11 HYACINTHE SERRONI, ENTRETIENS AFFECTIFS DE L’AME AVEC DIEU, SUR LES PSEAUMES
DE LA PENITENCE (Paris, Antoine Dezallier1686).
12 Id. at sig. a.ii.v.
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declarations for daily life within the order addressed to his “children”) a similar
focus is evident. The psalms are the keys to the kingdom, the hymns will bring
sanctuary and connection, one needs only to approach with fear and
“psalmodize wisely: I will praise you in the presence of the angels.”13
To this end, reverting again to Serroni as our exemplar, the Archbishop
offers his text, a commentary of great detail upon the Psalms of David, as a
guide to penitence and to the rules of behavior that stem from it. Referring then
to his source, the book of sacred songs, he observes that the Spanish monarch,
“your father in the faith,” has recently, in his generosity and wisdom, allowed a
translation of the Psalms of David into the vernacular:
Now you can boast that you have received from the hand of the greatest of Monarchs
the living expressions of the heart of the holy King David, and so the Kings have
become your nurses (nourissiers) and you have been suckled by doubly Royal
breasts.14

There is little need to engage in any Freudian digression on the image of
the nursing father, the King who offers his breast to nourish the newly converted. Note only the obvious, namely, that there is a strongly erotic tone, a
passion, an intense sense of enjoyment of this royal breastfeeding. It is almost
a disappointment, at least to modern eyes, that what should be fluid, milky
secretions from the nipple is in fact but a reference to a text. Hyacinthe Serroni
is in some respects prepared for such a reaction and praises the psalms, the
songs of laudation, in words borrowed from Saint Augustine: “everything that
is of use in the Scriptures is collected in the single Book of Psalms. It predicts
future events, it reports the histories of centuries past; it gives Rules for the
conduct of life; it is the great treasure chest of all good doctrine; it cures
(guerit) all of the wounds of Souls old and new in a swift, easy and admirable
fashion . . . .”15 The psalms provide a pleasurable and beneficial means of
maintaining the soul in relation to God, and variously allow the living member
of Christ’s body to meditate, pray, converse, and communicate with the divinity
via the acclamatory techniques and hymnological apparatuses of the psalms.
If the purpose of the vernacular publication of the psalms, along with the
Archbishop’s commentary, is strictly a practical one, a convocational exercise,
then it is the technical details that are most interesting. There is, as noted, a
dual structure to the commentator’s introduction. King David is sovereign and
untouchable, the resplendent juggernaut of near Eastern mythology, latterly
Leviathan in the common law tradition, a very public image of an intangible
power.16 This is maiestas, the living representation of an absent God, the delegate or vicar of Christ on Earth whose path is paved with glory and praises,
whose body is mystical and whose dignity never dies. Kantorowicz famously
traced the legal architecture of this concept of sovereignty but it is one that is
most obviously for show and belief, not for conversation. This sovereign rules
but does not govern. There has to be another side, an alternate face and an
13

SAINT BENEDICT, LA REGLE DU B. PERE S. BENOIST 99 (1701).
SERRONI, supra note 11, at sig. a.iii.v.
15 Id. at a.iii.r.
16 On this figure and its origins, according to the maxim ex oriente lux, see PIYEL HALDAR,
LAW, ORIENTALISM AND POSTCOLONIALISM: THE JURISDICTION OF THE LOTUS EATERS 10126 (2007).
14
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interior mode to David’s gargantuan presence, and this is precisely the administration of the soul that is so intimately presented and ritualistically acted out in
the progression of the psalms.
The sovereign who breastfeeds is still King, legislator, maker, and promulgator of laws. In the terminology of Hyacinthe Serrroni’s commentary, however, where it is a question not of public veneration but of private life, of being
in its everyday, multiple, and interior affects, and the moods of the household
subjects, then the norms are administrative and practical. It is knowledge, sure
enough, that is conveyed, but in the form of guides, instructions, moralizing
maxims, and emblematic images that will direct the desires and focus the aspirations of the believer. It is in the end the practice of belief that has to be
inscribed, embodied, and acted out quite explicitly “so as to maintain you in the
good and to repress the most violent passions.”17 And of course there is more
to this administration and care of the soul, but at the moment it is the dual
structure that I will excerpt because this is what the common lawyers most
strikingly adopt. John Selden indeed inscribes an entire history of common law
with the title Jani Anglorum and his title page carries a woodcut of the two
faced Janus, along with a maxim that is intriguingly doctrinal in its implications. The motto reads haec facies populum spectat, at illa larem and translates
most properly as “this face looks to the multitude and the other to the tutelar
deities of the household.”18 While this may seem a curious representation of a
specifically English law, and of course has its roots in Roman law and most
immediately in Alciatus’ Emblemata, there is a distinctively Anglican
interpretation.19
The motto of Aciatus’ Janus is prudentes, meaning foreseeing but also
intelligent, prudent, and versed. In Renaissance Latin, prudens also has the
shorthand meaning of learned in law and thus what we now mean generically
by lawyer. The image accompanying the motto is of two faces floating over a
group of houses. This is a law that is expressly depicted as also entering the
home and taking hold of the tutelary life, the patterns and prayers of the domestic inner sanctum, be it conceived as the gynaeceum or amicitia, the amatory or
amicable. This sense of governance, of a floating spirit, a face whose aspect is
turned spectrally to the most intimate and invisible dimensions of human life, is
picked up upon by the English emblematists, the priest Geffrey Whitney and
the lawyer George Wither.20 Both reproduce the admitted hieroglyph of
omniscience, and Wither, in particular, refers in his description of Janus to a
17

SERRONI, supra note 11, at sig. a.iiii.r.
JOHN SELDEN, JANI ANGLORUM FACIES ALTERA MEMORIA NEMPE A PRIMULA HENRICI II
tit. p. (London, 1681).
19 ANDREAS ALCIATUS, EMBLEMATUM LIBER (1531) was reprinted and translated numerous
times. It became the standard reference although THOMAS COMBE, THEATER OF FINE
DEVICES, CONTAINING AN HUNDRED MORALL EMBLEMES (London, Richard Field 1614) uses
the first French vernacular emblem book, the lawyer GUIILLAUME LA PERRIÈRE, LE THEATRE
DES BONS ENGINS (Paris, Janot 1540), as his source, and is inventive in his interpretive
vernacular verses.
20 GEFFREY WHITNEY, A CHOICE OF EMBLEMES, AND OTHER DEVISES 108 (Leyden, Christopher Plantyn 1636); GEORGE WITHER, A COLLECTION OF EMBLEMES, ANCIENT AND
MODERNE 138 (London, Augustine Mathewes 1634).
18
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God “[t]o whom, all hidden things are truly knowne.”21 The most extraordinary emblem of Janus, however, comes from Henry Peacham’s lesser-known
Basilikon Doron of 1610, where the figure of Janus is utilized to castigate
pride.22 The image is of a wide brimmed black hat placed over a crown, floating over a landscape with a tree in the foreground. The tree is the figure of
amity and loyalty and the hat-encrusted crown floats a distance from it, connoting infidelity and connivance. In the background, visible but not very close, is
the city from which one can but suppose the unfaithful and arrogant emblem of
deceit has been exiled. Beyond that, and the point of significance here, is that
the hat cannot hide the crown, mere vestment will not mask the pride or arrogation of the “pharisees” (puritans) who seek to feign piety through venerable
vestments and yet who are, in the reality of their practice, far from righteousness in Peacham’s eyes. The clothes are seen through, the skin cannot mask,
the face will not hide the ever present and all seeing hovering law.23 If nothing
escapes the law, then the urgency and the instructiveness of Serroni’s everyday
lessons in affective maintenance of the soul’s relationship to God become ever
more evident.
Wide-brimmed hats cannot hide the subject from the eye of the law. The
pride that propels the fashion of mask and vestimentary deflection is also visible to the spectral ruler. If Janus can always see through merely mortal
designs, or as the early modern lawyers put it, the divine can always “outsee”
and proclaim video et rideo (“I look and I laugh”), then the public shows and
spectacles of the ius triumphi, declarations and promulgations, columns and
theatre of sovereignty, vehement visibilities, and monumental appearances of
legality, are of a secondary significance. For these shows to be possible, for
there to be an audience, first there must be an interior order, a mapping of legal
emotions that will capture the subject and attach her to law. In the Latin tradition, which the common lawyers were very happy to adapt to their own causes,
patria potestas, the domestic hierarchy and internal order, precedes regia
potestas or the sovereign and plural version of the oikonomia, meaning the
administrative order and rhetorical, which is to say persuasive and active disposition that derives ultimately from the household as the first order and hierarchy
of management.24 The law as nursing parent and the sovereign as suckling
breast are both images of an interior transmission, of an invisible—yet more
effective—non-law that takes hold in the ghostly realm of the spirit. The
domain of mundane administrative efficacy, of the actual apparatus of implementation, meaning “disposition” and instantiation—governance in Agamben’s
argot—belongs paradoxically to the less obviously visible practice of affective
21

WHITNEY, supra note 20; WITHER, supra note 20.
GEORGE PEACHAM, BASILIKON DORON 96 (Daly ed., 1998) (1604). The epigram reads:
Iane Pharisaici tibi mitto hae symbola fastus (“I send you, Janus, this symbol of your Pharisee-like arrogance”).
23 See generally MICHAEL STOLLEIS, THE EYE OF THE LAW: TWO ESSAYS ON LEGAL HISTORY (2009) (on the figure and metaphoric meaning of the eye of the law in a historical
perspective).
24 Zartaloudis, supra note 4, at 56-65 (provides an invaluable philological account of oikonomia as the conjunction of oikos and nomos, household and norm).
22
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maintenance and governance of the soul. It is this thesis that Agamben has
recently and extensively examined.

OBJET

PETIT L

(THE LOST OBJECT

OF

LAW)

Walter Benjamin perhaps captured the point first in a fragment in which
he remarked enigmatically that “nothing historical can relate itself on its own
account to anything Messianic.”25 The historical is in this view the downfall of
the Kingdom of God, just as the messianic is the demise of history. It is therefore necessary, in Benjamin’s rather elliptical view, to separate history and theology, the profane and the messianic, happiness and religion, so that
temporality has its day. Benjamin uses the metaphor of two arrows shot in
opposite directions and yet, even if opposed, the two forces are not unconnected, but rather increase each other “so the order of the profane assists,
through being profane, the coming of the Messianic Kingdom,” and the profane
is indeed in this conception “a decisive category of its quietest approach.”26
For Agamben the relevant distinction is precisely that between secularization
and profanation: “Secularization is a form of repression. It leaves intact the
forces it deals with by simply moving them from one place to another.”27 The
repressed returns, presses against the barrier of consciousness, as we know, and
it is here, in glimpses, flashes, symptoms, and pain, that a new category that
intervenes between the opposed forces is sought. For Benjamin it is paradoxically “a worldly restitution that leads to the eternity of downfall,”28 and
Agamben further specifies a restoration to human use: “For to profane means
not simply to abolish and erase separations but to learn to put them to a new
use, to play with them.”29
The protocols of the critical theorists are happiness and play, erasure and
use value. In any event, the issue that Benjamin allusively touches upon by
way of referring to the dynamic of historical happiness as the downfall of the
eternal is one that has haunted political theology. Rather than tracking the distinct and opposed trajectories of the historical and the Messianic, the political
theologians have rather theorized a direct transmission from the transcendental
to the immanent, from the ecclesiastical to the secular. The jurisdiction of the
Church, meaning in essence the theory and figures of divine hierarchy and sovereign rule, in a word unhappiness, is viewed as a simple transfer into the new
secular and reputedly modern order. The complementary dualism of Church
and State, the parallelism of spiritual and terrestrial, is regarded as a split internal to the secular order which thus takes on, in the language variously of Filmer
and of Hobbes, the sacral character of absolute power. This is reductio ad
unum, a singular state embodied in its iconic figures of the Holy See of which it
25 See WALTER BENJAMIN, Theologico-Political Fragment, in ONE-WAY STREET 155
(1997); Thanos Zartaloudis, Soulblind, or On Profanation, in THE WORK OF GIORGIO
AGAMBEN: LAW, LITERATURE, LIFE 132-48 (Justin Clemens et al. eds., 2008) (picks up on
this theme in the argot of happiness).
26 BENJAMIN, supra note 25.
27 GIORGIO AGAMBEN, PROFANATIONS 77 (2007) (hereinafter “AGAMBEN, PROFANATIONS”).
28 BENJAMIN, supra note 25.
29 AGAMBEN, PROFANATIONS, supra note 27, at 87.
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is, in theory, the delegate and vicarious exemplum. It is against this simplification and reduction that Agamben pitches the Trinitarian theology of oikonomia,
discussed below, and towards which Hyacinthe Serroni’s treatise on affective
maintenance is directed.
I neither intend nor am I able to provide a full reconstruction of
Agamben’s philological and doctrinal analyses. The figure of the history that
he conveys, however, could well be that of Janus, the emblem of common law
who represents a divided polity and dualistic methodology by means of a two
headed (Jane bifrons) divinity. Variously represented in emblematic texts, the
key feature of Janus is of course the unity of the double aspect. It is one and
the same figure who looks forward and back, outside and inside, above and
below. This is key to the programmatic interpretation of Agamben that we find
in Zartaloudis because, where political theology has argued that there are two
orders, divine and human, that are serially linked, one giving way to the other,
one subordinate to the other, Agamben offers a more subtle interpretation. The
order may be two-faced, lissome and supple, but it remains one, undivided and
complex in the model of the triune, father and son in variably antagonistic and
harmonious relation, and between them the Holy Spirit, the invisible order of
angels, the visible realm of the clouds. This thesis is both political and doctrinal, and it is to the theological and philological roots of the argument that I will
briefly turn.
Agamben’s argument, pursued in extraordinary detail, is that there is a
missing dimension to the modern reception of the early Christian tradition of
political theology. The sovereign who rules, on the model of the divine legislator and his delegate, is only one moment of a more complex model of rule and
governance, classically arche and dynamis, order and movement, which has
not one but two faces. The duplicem vim (dual order and power of the divinity)
resides in a distinction that theology has variably elaborated between God and
Christ, spirit and incarnation, contemplation and action, substance and relation,
being and economy. So distinct indeed are the two sides of divinity that theologians would often speak of two distinct Gods, as for example the second century Platonist philosopher Numenius who distinguishes a first divinity, the
king, a stranger to the world, a transcendent and totally inoperative God, from a
second God who, by way of contrast, is active and occupied with the government of the world.30 In the later Latin tradition the distinction is between deus
otiosus, rex inutilis, (a superfluous god, a useless king) and a secondary order
embodied in deus actuosus, a divinity concerned with the practical guidance
and governance of being.
The concept of a dual order, of a nominal ruler and a secondary figure
who implements the actual governance of beings, threatens to present a polytheistic conception of order against which Christianity had defined and distinguished itself. Agamben’s thesis is that the concept of the Trinity was the
doctrinal response to this threat of plural Gods. Christ comes as part of the
Father, as a god who is internal to God, both part of and separate from the
creator and encompasser of all being. In the conception of Boethius, there is a
divine providence and then a second order of destiny that is concerned with the
30

AGAMBEN, LA RÈGNE, supra note 4, at 127 (citing Numenius).
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disposition or oikonomia of terrestrial things. The former order is transcendent,
the latter is imminent, and this conception corresponds broadly to the Thomist
distinction between general and special providence, the former directed to first
causes and to the order of God, the latter to that of the other (ad invicem), the
secondary and contingent realm of governance.31 Be the theology as it may,
and there is now a very secure guide to this doctrinal trajectory, the important
point for hermeneutic analysis is that Christian humanity is born and exists
under a double sentence, a duplicem sententiam according to the author of the
Tractus de amore, which does not imply division so much as it does dialogue
and disposition.32
This model of governance, represented not by the mythology of Leviathan
but rather by the Janus of common law, is elaborated in the forgotten texts of
the lesser order or secondary act, which is that of economic administration, the
management of the household, and the disposition of beings according to the
practical dictates of everyday conduct. In Christian terminology, the being who
comes before law already has the law internally inscribed and is thus ready and
malleable for the lex ceremoniarum, the rites and observances of the public
realm. The oikonomic sphere, as Mondzain has brilliantly elaborated, is one of
relation and instantiation according to the order of images, the icons of oikonomia that direct the senses and organize the organs of the subject to desire and
address themselves towards the divinity.33 It is here, in recuperating and expatiating upon the concept of oikonomia, that Agamben makes his most novel
contribution.
Elaborating the Thomist, neo-scholastic theory of earthly rule, Agamben
traces the forgotten order of oikonomia—in Latin dispositio—as the art of governance and practical implementation of power in the domestic realm.34 This
relates to the ius imaginum to the causes of connection and hierarchy of places
within the order of images that would later be mislaid, or dismissed as an
archaism of social pageantry, a forgotten aspect of the over-invested spectacles
of early common law. For Agamben, however, the key to oikonomia resides in
understanding that the jointure of the two faces of Janus accurately portrays the
dual aspect of a single hierarchy and order of law. The principle of oikonomia
is one of substitution, of the son for the father of superior for inferior within
what is paradoxically, or at least in the abstraction of doctrine, an egalitarian
order. The principle of circulation of power is that of vicarious displacements
of office and role in which “[t]he ontology of acts of government is a vicarious
ontology in the sense that, in the interior of the economic paradigm, all power
has a vicarious character, and performs the offices of another. This means that
there is no ‘substance’ but only an ‘economy’ of power.”35 Each carries within
the image of a higher power in whose name they act. This potestas vicaria
(vicarious power) is replicated throughout the entire order of social being but
has its most acute site of application, its vanishing point one could say, in the
31

Id. at 177
The esoteric reference here is to 3 ANDREAS CAPELLANUS, TRACTATUS DE AMORE 322 (P.
G. Walsh ed. & trans., 1982) (1190).
33 See generally MARIE-JOSE MONDZAIN, IMAGE, ICÔNE, ECONOMIE (1996).
34 AGAMBEN, LA RÈGNE, supra note 4, at 210.
35 Id. at 219.
32
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tutelary realm, in the gynaeceum and in what transpires to be the far from
innocent domain of the familial playpen.
The Royal oikonomia reflects the divine oikos and management, just as
the household of the lowliest subject reflects the hierarchy and principles of the
royal domesticity. The logic of substitution is an apparatus of transmission that
both structures the interior according to an exterior norm, the household and the
polity, but also and less obviously inscribes the affect of worship, of reverence
for hierarchy and a sense of the sacred into the seemingly secular social order
of being. Take hierarchy first. The principle of imitation of empire (imitatio
imperii) that Pierre Legendre has lengthily excavated is one that inscribes the
subject into the symbolic order in accordance with the image of the divinity –
haec imago as the Latin vulgate puts it.36 That said, what makes this descending order of subjects, each in the image of its progenitor, possible is a system of
substitutions that theologians depicted early on as the earthly reflection of a
heavenly hierarchy, human order as the mirror of the angelic. Régis Debray in
his Exact Science of Angels makes the point that the order of the earthly city
must reflect that of the celestial city, and the latter is organized and governed
according the complex hierarchy of angels. The positions and posts of the
earthly city reflect the echelons of the angelic: “It was only when the absolute
took refuge in the abstract, in monotheism, that the figure of the intercessor
became ineluctable. God’s absence-presence had to be bridged by an imagistic
interface between invisible divinity and our downcast eyes of flesh and
blood.”37
The theory of angels, in Agamben’s succinct description, is a theory of
government, plain and simple. Debray accedes to a similar point in also
acknowledging that “Pious figuration had the jump on bookish conceptualization (the image gets to things before the idea can). And it indeed proved necessary for men of dogmas and theses to catch up to those who worked in
images.”38 This, of course, may simply seem to be a vivid way of depicting the
task of hermeneutics as that of studying the figures of transmission, the little
images and petty icons (icunculae) of the reformed and vernacular text of the
scriptures.39 There is more, however, at play than the mere inscription of hierarchy, the echelons on the escutcheon, the order of precedence within the law
of honor at the state dinner, the opening of a parliament, the inauguration of a
president, the investiture of a bishop, or the appointment of a dean. These
36

The most recent elaboration is to be found in PIERRE LEGENDRE, L’AUTRE BIBLE DE
L’OCCIDENT: LE MONUMENT ROMANO-CANONIQUE. ÉTUDE SUR L’ARCHITECTURE DOGMATIQUE DES SOCIÉTÉS 100 (2009).
37 RÉGIS DEBRAY, TRANSMITTING CULTURE 35 (Eric Rauth trans., Columbia Univ. Press
2000) (1997) (hereinafter “DEBRAY, TRANSMITTING CULTURE”). An expanded version of
this argument can also be found in RÉGIS DEBRAY, CROIRE, VOIR, FAIRE: TRAVERSES(1999)
where he argues, in the context of the maxim that “no-one rules immediately,” that the angel
is the principle of symbolic efficacy as such. There has to be a mode of transmission from
abstract to concrete and angelology is the form it has taken.
38 DEBRAY, TRANSMITTING CULTURE, supra note 37, at 37.
39 THOMAS PHILIPOT, A BRIEF HISTORICAL DISCOURSE OF THE ORIGINAL AND GROWTH OF
HERALDRY, DEMONSTRATING UPON WHAT RATIONAL FOUNDATIONS, THAT NOBLE AND HEROICK SCIENCE IS ESTABLISHED 7 (London, E. Tyler & R. Holt 1672). I have commented on
that text in Peter Goodrich, A Note on Icunculae, 13 PÒLEMOS 3 (2009).
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vestiges of military ranking, translated from the army of angels, may ensconce
hierarchy in the social but they do not directly address the affective inscription
of honor, the norm of reverence and obedience that was to be shown towards
parents and that subtends the acclamatory and hymnological apparatus of the
interior realm, the dialogue of the soul with non-being.
Debray mentions images, and Legendre has discussed the role of dance in
generating subjective passion and love of authority, but Agamben places these
in their proper doctrinal context.40 The affective dimension of hierarchy is not
simply lodged initially at the level of the family but is inscribed through the
entire liturgy of psalm and song, prayer and penitence. The subject must be
brought to sing. Not only should the chord within the individual be struck and
tuned, but the proper object of such rites should be the hierarchy of authority
that leads to the divine. The subject is to admire and sing the praises of the
collective figureheads, the father, the captain, the headmaster, the line manager,
the judge, the crown, the sovereign, and thence the power that they represent:
“Glory is the space where theology endeavors to think the impossible conciliation between the immanent Trinity and the economic Trinity, between theologia and oikonomia, between being and practice, between God in itself and
God for us.”41 It is in and through hymn and song, psalm and prayer, through
the entire paraphernalia of liturgical rites, laudation, and acclamation, that the
soul of the subject is attached to and comes to accept the hierarchy to which
they belong. Could it be otherwise?
Politics, in its Western juridical form, is an intrinsically theological
endeavor within which the variable modes of acclamation, and now the everyday media spectacles of politics, law, state action, and sovereign pronouncement, provide the affective bond, the interior dialogue that authorizes power
and, in Agamben’s version, binds rule to governance, politics to economy.
More than that, the liturgical modes of acclamation, now incorporated into the
diverse forms of political and legal popularity that are used to justify everything
from war to legislative decisions, are juridical forms. Kantorowicz was the first
to note that the mystery that is embodied in ministry is a jurisprudential invention.42 The acclamation is a modality of justice—dignum et iustum est (it is
proper and just) according to the old formula—and part of the ritual signification of power within the Church but equally, if in less florid modes, in the state
and judiciary.43 Vestments, robes, portraits, bars and benches, ceremonial
openings, solemn oaths, flags, insignia, and sacred, or at least carefully
guarded, sites of publication and promulgation all serve to bolster legal authority by means of optical indications of authority. The eyes, hands, and mouth
are opened to inhale and express the aura of legality. Reverence circulates
according to inherited patterns.
Returning to Serroni and the guide that he offers to affective bonding, the
dialogue of the soul with God, one can note two structural features to the manual. The first is the trajectory from penitence to salvation. The subject begins
40

See, e.g., PIERRE LEGENDRE, LA PASSION D’ÊTRE UN AUTRE: ÉTUDE
(1978).
41 AGAMBEN, LA RÈGNE, supra note 4, at 314.
42 Ernst Kantorowicz, Mysteries of State, in SELECTED STUDIES (1965).
43 AGAMBEN, LA R
ÈGNE, supra note 4, at 261.
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by acknowledging his or her failure. Penitence, as the sixth Psalm of David
vividly elaborates, begins with confession, a self-abasement, and acknowledgment of weakness, infirmity, and sin. The plea for forgiveness is directed to the
divinity and Serroni offers the appropriate arguments: “there are two reasons
that I put forward for the forgivenness of my sins; one is your mercy, the other
my weakness.”44 Obviously enough, it is not sufficient for the penitent subject
to mend their ways. Mere reform does not erase the always pre-existent debt,
the fact of prior sin and iniquity which the Lord alone can “obliterate from the
soul.”45 The trajectory of penitence is toward forgiveness by the external force
and the tag at the end of each confessional statement is that the plea be
answered, the subject forgiven, saved, and cured of their transgressions. The
model of this salvation is juridical in the sense that the plea for salvation is a
prelude to that terrible day, the last day of judgment when each must account
for their lives. It is this plea to the one who will be the judge on that day which
fills the air with the cries of the penitent—help me, cure me, wash me, save me,
overlook me, dispose of me as you will. The sixth Psalm, as glossed by Serroni, in fact offers a visual metaphor: “Turn your eyes towards this miserable
sinner, and have pity upon me: Turn, like a gracious (affable) Prince, a benign
and merciful [sovereign], towards this rebellious subject who cries out now for
mercy and swears an eternal fidelity to you . . . . Turn towards me as an indulgent judge . . . . Turn towards me like a loving father towards a rebellious
child.”46 Here, then, is the judge fully described as loving parent, nursing
father, patient, gracious, benign and merciful. Here is the source of judgment
expressed in the invisible face of the sovereign or his delegates, locked in the
gaze of the infinite and ineffable. Later, in the fiftieth Psalm: “Turn your face
away (averte faciem tuam) from my sins and obliterate my iniquities.”47 I will
look toward you while you look away from my wrongdoing. I cannot see and
you are, in any event, invisible and must be taken on the strength of trust,
which is to say on the strength of the text.
If no one escapes the institution, if being a subject or a person in law
means membership of an institutional structure and symbolic order, the Christian pedagogy of subjective conduct provides a remarkable insight into the path
and direction of this penitent being. The mouth is opened, as Christians say, to
plead, to cry out, to implore, and also to praise and acclaim. These two subjective positions, these stances of affective attachment, are miraculously implanted
in advance of the symbolic birth of the subject. We are in this sense choral
beings, born to sing blame and praise, give penitence and laudation to an invisible higher being who is our judge and our salvation. Our model for this laudation is, as Agamben stresses, angelic. It is the choir of angels, the invisible
chorus of the celestial city that we mimic and hope eventually to join. The
second feature, then, of Serroni’s text is precisely affective. The Lord, the sovereign, the judge is a being who is extraordinarily weighed down by affective
qualifications. He is adorable, gracious, glorious, indulgent, admirable, magnificent, and merciful. These attributes, or so the penitent pleads, will eventu44
45
46
47

SERRONI, supra note 11, at 2.
Id. at 3.
Id. at 7.
Id. at 70.
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ally erase his anger, fury, and terribleness. This antinomy, however, belongs to
the surface and to the extreme, to crimes and iniquities, as opposed to the more
mundane and repeated affectivities of a lesser order. Put differently, the pleadings place the subject in a collective choral space, a zone of praises, along with
their songs, defining the subject as a member of the brotherhood, community,
flock, and choir.
Serroni is most particular on what belonging to the Church means: “[Y]ou
cannot sing a pleasing Canticle to the Lord from a foreign land, or you would
unceasingly dishonor his name.”48 To join the living body of Jesus-Christ is
more than anything else a hymnal act, an entry into a “happy Sion” and “Holy
City” where the grandeur and magnificence of the Lord can be experienced
through the singing of praises: “Happy are those who inhabit the house of the
Lord, they praise him throughout the century of centuries.”49 The psalms are
translated precisely in this manner to allow subjects to sacrifice perpetual
praises to the Lord. In this way, in every moment, the subject can maintain an
affective dialogue, an interior song—prayer or plea—directed towards the
divinity. As far as the psalmist is concerned, we are silent until the praise of
the Lord opens our lips—Domine labia mea aperies.50 Once opened, the
mouth lauds the Lord in unison with all the others, King and populace together,
who exist in the glory and sing the praises of the divine, of the clouds that look
down on the earth, of the sky, of the mysteries.
Curious though it may seem to engage in a hymnological and acclamatory
analysis of the subtexts of law, including the codes and administrative practices
of governance, this is precisely the currently unquestioned, not yet profaned,
affective dimension of an otherwise exterior rule. If one attends closely to the
language of the gloss on the Psalms, what is at stake is, in the end, a question of
economic disposition, the administration of the interior subject through the
maintenance of an affective dialogue with the divine. Serroni is admirably
direct: “there is no need to search for external examples, when I have the
domestic (domestique) example of my own soul and my own experiences” of
divine grace.51 The household of the soul must come to mirror the house of the
Lord. The interior path, “the sacrifice of praises” to the divinity is the royal
road to justice—sacrificium iustitiae.52 The acclamatory trajectory, which
passes through and joins with law, is one that is directed towards a collective
justice, a rhythm and song that carries the singular into the community, the
collective symbolic order of praises and venerations, admiration, and spectacle.
The lawful subject exists in unison of worship, mouth open, hands outstretched,
eyes raised to the firmament in loving aspiration.
THE EMPTY TOMB
The interior quality of justice, its oikonomic—domestic—location and
practice, lends an immediacy and experiential presence to justice and law as
48
49
50
51
52

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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fol. Aiiv.
fol. Aiiir.
77.
82-83.

\\server05\productn\N\NVJ\10-3\NVJ302.txt

622

unknown

Seq: 16

NEVADA LAW JOURNAL

26-OCT-10

8:31

[Vol. 10:607

acclamatory enterprises, as bodily practices that subtend governance. Justice
and law seem far removed from, better and much more immediate and visceral
than the abstractions and academicisms that are normally associated with critical hermeneutics and the spider’s web of texts that are associated with them.
Archbishop Serroni’s remarkable manual makes vivid and visceral sense of
Agamben’s argument that glory, laudations, acclamations, and hymns of the
intimate public realm, including service, penitence, self-reflection, contemplation, and prayer, are intrinsic elements and necessary supports of the juridical
order and sovereign law. Praise invests, imbues, and permeates power. It is the
primary modality of its practice. Approval ratings, approbation, denigration
(lessening of praise), clapometers, cheers, canned laughter, citation counts,
YouTube hits, website visit counts, and celebrity in all its forms flood the public sphere and keep the soul directed towards and in dialogue with the song of
the collective, the medium of the affective law, the disposition and distribution
of the subjects of governance, and the singing and signing bodies of the interior
public sphere.
Political theology has tended to distance the modern polity from the religious sources that it deems were inherited by or reproduced in a secular form
within the contemporary public domain. Sovereignty, the presence of maiestas
and dignitas (office/dignity) in modernity, is viewed as something of a philological relic, an archaism of charismatic leadership in what were—at least for a
while—deemed rational times. For Agamben, however, the political is and
remains indelibly religious precisely because of the loss of the doctrine of economy and the consequent failure to explicate and address the affective practices
of governance, including actual and interior administration. The public sphere,
the domain of rule and law, depends upon the science of government and affective administrative techniques that the Trinitarian doctrine of economy produces. Even in the modern state “the decisive element remains that towards
which the providential machinery was from the very beginning directed: the
oikonomia, the knowledge of the governance of men and things.”53 As Serroni
teaches, this is in large measure a science of praises, an art of adulation that
mirrors the celestial order, the hierarchy of angels, and the ineffable chorus of
Holy specters, and, by doing so, elicits love of power in the form of the second
or human order of acclamation.
What then of post-critical legal hermeneutics? How is a revival of progressive vision, of a radical or rebellious anima legis or juridical spirit to be
accomplished? The answer, according to Agamben, lies in profanation.54
What was sacred must be profaned, which is to say that it must be returned to
human use, to playful purpose, to a species of innocence or reinvention. The
argument, taken up in detail by Zartaloudis, is that we remain within political
theology and must find a path beyond it.55 The logic of such movement
beyond norm and law, meaning hierarchy and subjection, as Agamben
53

AGAMBEN, LA RÈGNE, supra note 4, at 221.
AGAMBEN, PROFANATIONS, supra note 27, at 73.
55 THANOS ZARTALOUDIS, THE IDEA OF JUSTICE (manuscript on file with the author). On the
concept of the “Beyond” and its uses in critical legal theory, see Ralph Sandland, Feminist
Theory and Law: Beyond the Possibilities of the Present?, in FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES ON
LAW AND THEORY 89 (Janice Richardson & Ralph Sandland eds., 2000).
54
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powerfully notes, lies in the subsisting choral core of political theology: “secularization is a form of repression.”56 Only the movement “beyond,” meaning
into the classical jurist’s “free use,” a transformed modality and its desacralized
practices, into heterotopic spaces, makes any seizing of the time or taking back
of the critical project possible.57 This program, however, remains and perhaps
must remain an abstract invocation if it is to avoid becoming legislative, legal,
or an imposition. It has to remain unfinished, to borrow an earlier formulation.
That status will not be challenged here, but rather an attempt will be made to
address the more substantive implications of the acclamatory apparatus that
Agamben has so rigorously outlined.
The initial and perhaps crucial point that Agamben makes is that of the
theological antinomy of the two orders, transcendent and immanent, glorious
and glorifying, sovereign and subjected. The division distinguishes a realm of
providential inactivity, great books, monumental texts, and the sovereign as
some version of Leviathan against a second order of actuality, meaning administration, disposition, and execution within the world. This second order,
despite its primary role in actuality, tends to be overlooked. Certainly the Trinitarian theology of oikonomia—of the administration of things “domestique” or
interior—has lacked its expositors and practitioners. Even the Marxists viewed
practice—the changing of the world—as being an exterior endeavor, a replacement of the regnum providentiae rather than an attention to the administration
of persons and images in their secular and internal realm. The ordo ad Deum
still trumped the ordo ad invicem other realm, and so the divine order transcends the practices of men. So an initial and intriguing insight emerges from
the theological seriousness of Agamben’s study: the apparatus of government,
the texts to which attention should be turned, are not necessarily those that
claim to be law. Serroni’s treatise, the emanations of planet Hollywood, the
chorus of celebrity culture, and the internal hierarchy of the academy will provide a dangerous and potentially liberating supplement to the dark order of
black letter law or the dirges of its doctrinal elaborations.
The opposition between rule and governance can be drawn out in a number of liberatory ways. What has been argued, most simply, is that it is not so
much legal rule as promulgated in public legislative orders or judicial decrees,
but governance, not sovereignty but administration—what we now call regulation—that needs to be addressed. The Trinitarian position is one that called
attention to Christ as the image of God, as the implementation of the divine on
Earth, both part of the father and born as the son ego est in patre et pater in me
est . . . . qui videt me videt patrem meum. Christ represents that divine economy, the administration of providence executed on Earth. It is, at least for the
Christian West, Christ that matters and fills in the law while also pointing to its
fulfillment in myth or afterlife. It is the apparatus of manifestation and disposition that matters, not the general rule. This reference is to the moment and
occasion of actual administration, of instant attention, but there is a further
aspect to this governance that is perhaps both more and less obvious. The
apparatus, as the example of Christ’s presence on Earth makes amply evident,
56
57

AGAMBEN, PROFANATIONS, supra note 27, at 77.
AGAMBEN, WHAT IS AN APPARATUS?, supra note 4, at 18.
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is a mode of appearance, a way of making hierarchy visible and affectively
present. It is not the rule that binds but rather the manifestation that authorizes,
the spectacle that legitimates, and thus the image that solemnizes and ordains
the substantive and visible practice that will first take hold in the imagination.
Christ is the image of the father and so it is logically necessary to consider the
regime of the visual or the order of appearance as the first archive of hierarchical being, the originary scission, cut or wound that marks the space, the hidden
order, that governance must fill, that oikonomia will dispose. Nothing, as the
medieval lawyers liked to put it, is more beautiful than order—nihil pulchrius
ordine—and that reference is also to the array of images, the hierarchy of insignia, the ius imaginum—the viscera and vividness of the visible world.
The optical apparatus of governance is little-studied and less understood.
There are few hints in the extant jurisprudential texts except occasional asides
that refer to what are invariably treated as incidental features of the juridical
regimen of social being: the art of law; nomenclatures of legal purity; rules of
recognition of official conduct; internal hierarchy of the legal academy; interior
points of view; and diverse modes of promulgation and dissemination that usually fall along some species of textual lines. References to colors, insignia,
symbols, portraiture, tropes, trophies, vestments, rites, dance, psalm, and song
are much less common, indeed positively continental. This is despite the fact
that the real artisans of law’s ritual and repetitive presence are the common
lawyers, or at least that was historically so. Returning to the lines of sight that
constitute the most immediate presence of the governmental apparatus does
indeed take us outside of law as conventionally and majestically conceived. It
is not that there is no visible order of sovereign presence, it is in fact manifold
and spectacular. It is rather that there is reason to take up these signs and their
ordering and division in novel forms.
According to one etymology that Agamben favors—others are “insipid
and incorrect” (just to give you a taste)—religion stems from re-legere, meaning to read multiple times, to dwell upon and take slowly.58 For post-critical
legal hermeneutics this injunction to read again, reflect upon, and address the
“law that is no longer applied but only studied” is simply a start.59 It is, and I
will be very tentative about this, a rather academic approach, even if it is a very
necessary one. The necessity derives from the insistence upon re-reading, a
critically reflexive overturning of the methods of juristic complacency and doctrinal common sense. On the other hand, the long trajectory through the doctrine of the Trinity and the appearance of the divine in the human, father in the
son, and, to be rudely direct about it, meaning in the image has a more dynamic
implication. It is what is visible, what is made to appear and gets to be seen—
acclaimed and sung as community—the practices of governance and the manifestations of hierarchy, that should claim attention.
The order of the visible is not amenable to the usual modes of textual
hermeneutics. This is because, in some respects, it is not a purely textual enterprise, but rather, as the concept of apparatus implies, an inscription of writing
in a more diverse and stronger sense, a point of intersection between word and
58
59

AGAMBEN, PROFANATIONS, supra note 27, at 74.
Id. at 76.
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image, between text and world, rhetorical and performative and so requires a
different method of viewing, sensuous apprehension, and reverie of thought, as
opposed to merely reading. The question posed by the apparatus of visual dissemination is that of the interlinear and apprehensive moments of encounter
that songs, indicators, monitors, screens, and other installations, including texts,
produce. The ambient text, the ambulatio in interpretive theory, is a reference
to the corpus, the body, the image, the face in the world and of the world. The
crucial moment here is that of impact, the Trinitarian impossible unity in which
the order of ideas impacts what Serroni aptly depicted as the extant and living
body of the world. It is a visual and tactile enterprise, an engagement and
infusion of the viscera into the actual. It is a reflection of what is imperfectly
seen and heard, arrayed, and orchestrated before and as the living being. At the
level of hermeneutics, it is art history that can probably teach lawyers the most
about how to view and interpret the apparatuses that have affect and effect in
the choral practices of daily life by performing and repeating the rites that
inscribe law.
The legal tradition inherited a lengthy history of ars docta (esoteric artistic
knowledge and visual representations). These took the form of elaborate codes
of visual knowledge that began with the military and civil science of administration, under the rubric of de notititia utraque dignitatum – translating literally
as Signs of Office—but also meaning signs of honor and celebrity, virtue and
nobility.60 For every office (dignitas) there was a name and an image along
with a description of what it was that the celebrity or noble who fulfilled that
office was assigned to do. Accompanying that art was the discipline of heraldry or blazon that had the task of representing the genealogical virtues, the
identity and honor of the family. This was for military and civic purposes and
would involve, as the lawyer Bartolus most famously expounded, the precise
use of color, elements, and mottos to mark the social place of the bearer.61
Often termed symbola heroica, the visual representation of the arms of the
ruling class, the noble and administrative family, was the progenitor of the
strictly juristic invention of the emblem book.62 Inordinately popular as a legal
and didactic genre for two centuries, the emblem books provided visual representations of moral and legal maxims with Latin mottos (the sign of law) and
accompanying, and generally vernacular, explanations in verse.
CONCLUSIONS
The commonwealth always was and certainly continues to be flooded with
images. These images have their own history, law, and art. The question that
this paper has traced, via the work of the unlikely duo of Serroni and Agamben,
is what impact this imagistic trajectory should properly have upon post-critical
60

See, e.g., GUIDO PANCIROLI, NOTITIA UTRAQUE, DIGNITATUM, CUM ORIENTIS, TUM
OCCIDENTIS, ULTRA ARCADII HONORIIQUE TEMPORA (London, Porta 1608).
61 See A GRAMMAR OF SIGNS (Oskar Cavallar et al. eds., 1995) (a modern edition of Bartolus’s Tractatus de insigniis).
62 See generally VALERIE HAYAERT, MENS EMBLEMATICA ET HUMANISME JURIDIQUE (2008)
(the essential work); Peter Goodrich, The Visial Line: On the Prehistory of Law and Film,
14 PARALLAX 55 (2008).
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legal hermeneutics. A series of conclusions can be drawn from the history and
can be used to proffer a project and revitalization of a movement at rest. The
first and most striking point is that images involve a different logic to that of
linear textuality and its analogical modes of reasoning. The image, to borrow
from the art historian Didi-Huberman, dissimulates.63 By this he refers to the
fact that the image does not represent, but rather figures a reference that
belongs within a visual and symbolic order. The daubs of red in Fra Angelico’s
scene noli me tangere, to use Huberman’s example, are not merely color and
are not flowers but rather, within the symbolic order that he paints for, are the
stigmata of Christ. What is seen, in other words, is not what is there but rather
the image directs the gaze according to complex rules of association within a
symbolic order. The image is hieroglyphic and enigmatic. We see as in a glass
darkly. The visual is a hint, and lures the understanding toward the mystery,
the impossibility that invisibly underpins incarnation. The lawyers make the
same point: “the symbol,” Abraham Fraunce opines, “is a representation by
which something is concealed.”64 It is, by the time that Fraunce is writing,
deemed a vestige or impression of other and higher causes, a relic belonging to
the order of the invisible. In other words, and here we can borrow from Freud,
the order of images obeys a logic of its own. We think in images but they both
impact us and direct us in lateral and unconscious ways.
The image operates and is to be interpreted according to its patterns of
condensation and displacement.65 Condensation refers to the compression of
meaning in the image, the storing of energy and also of diverse chains of association that represent primary processes. Freud uses the example of an italicized letter in a text.66 Condensation is the work of the dream in Freud, and in
legal hermeneutic terms is translated into the task of the administration of actuality, the work of law, in the theory of oikonomia. Displacement, by contrast,
refers to the transit of ideas, the shifting of energy from a repressed origin to a
dream image that is not directly connected to the base idea.67 Displacement is
the transit or passage between ideas, the slippage of meaning between latent
and manifest dream thoughts, in Freud’s determination. The simple daubs of
red in Fra Angelico’s painting can form an appropriate enough example. If we
follow the basic tenets of classical hermeneutics, we can address the meaning
of red in terms of the four levels of interpretation: literal, allegorical, ethical,
and spiritual. Each level represents a chain of associations, a pattern and transit
of meaning from the manifest to the signified, visible to invisible. Start then
with the lexical level. The literal meaning of red is from the color of blood and
refers most immediately to blood, and then to fire and sunset. The associations
that run from blood, fire, and sunset—such as passion, rage, and warning—can
63 GEORGES DIDI-HUBERMAN, FRA ANGELICO: DISSEMBLANCE AND FIGURATION 3 (Jane
Marie Todd trans., Univ. of Chicago Press 1995).
64 ABRAHAM FRAUNCE, SYMBOLICæ PHILOSOPHIæ LIBER QUARTUS ET ULTIMUS 2 (photo.
reprint 1981) (1585).
65 This Fruedian theme is discussed famously in CHRISTIAN METZ, THE IMAGINARY SIGNIFIER: PSYCHOANALYSIS AND THE CINEMA (Celia Britton & Annwyl Williams trans., Indiana
Univ. Press 1982) (1977); it gains a fascinating gloss in LAURENCE MOINEREAU, LE GÉNÉRIQUE DE FILM: DE LA LETTRE À LA FIGURE (2009).
66 MOINEREAU, supra note 65, at 127.
67 Id. at 143.
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be added to each of these figurative connotations. The second tier of allegorical meanings are too numerous to render, but are conventionally divided into
bright and dark red, and correlatively masculine and feminine significations.
Bright red is the life principle, the mark of stimulation, warriors, and the enthusiasms of war, as well as being a druidic sign of priestly combative skill. Dark
red, by contrast, is the sign of earth, womb, and menstruation.
The ethical meaning of red is inscribed in the legal works of armory that
codify the colors of the heraldic representation of virtue and fame. In armory,
red is termed sanguine and is “a princely colour”; according to Gerard Legh,
“[t]his colour, is of great estimatio[n], and very stately, and is th[e] apparel of
knights of the bathe, as also of the sergeants of the lawe at their [solemn]
feastes.”68 There is then the code of combinations of the color red with other
colors, planets, metals, and precious stones to form any particular blazon.
Enough, however, of the symbola heroica, interesting though they are; the final
meaning is anagogic or spiritual. Here, as was mentioned earlier, red is, in
theological terms, a mark of the wounding of Christ and brings with it the chain
of associations that treats the stigmata as proof of crucifixion. It is evidence of
the twice-impossible status of Christ as a non-man put to death, and as a divinity who rose again from the dead. It is the empty tomb that forms the backdrop
of the painting and paradoxically reveals, in its emptiness and openness, the
latency and power of the ordo ad invicem, the other scene of actual
administration.
The four different levels of meaning are taken from textual hermeneutics,
but it has to be remembered that in Christian theology there is, in practical
terms, a very visual if paradoxical origin to both text and word. They are signs
not simply because the word was in the beginning, before creation, but also and
in less elevated terms because the word was an image, visual mark, and impress
of an invisible cause. The empty tomb makes the point in the motto noli me
tangere, don’t touch me because I am both human and divine but also because
I, the son, am simply an image, a reference to the father. The sign, be it word
or color, is there to signal to something beyond and outside the tomb, yet
equally represented by and through it. The dissemblance that was earlier
remarked is that the empty tomb is far from empty, it is heavy with meaning, it
is the exemplary figure of an absent cause, the sign of an invisible truth. That
the image figures the truth, that it is veritas falsa (both real and dissembling), is
a common figure in legal treatises and has to be placed alongside another
maxim: it is the symbol that has effect, sends the message across, and gets the
work done.69 In a similar vein, the emblematist Bornitius offers: verbo et
signis efficax Deus—God [law] is efficacious through words and images—as
the accompanying visual emblem makes evident in the form of a heart with
eyes and ears inscribed on it floating over a somnolent city.70 The heart breaks
out of the clouds, the shadows, and stares directly at the viewer in a somewhat
68

GERARD LEGH, THE ACCEDENS OF ARMORY fo. 21 (London, Richard Tottill 1562).
The Latin, borrowed here from PIERRE LEGENDRE, DIEU AU MIROIR: ÉTUDE SUR
L’INSTITUTION DES IMAGES 201 (1994), is from Peter Lombard, the Latin being sacramentum, id est quod figurat.
70 J. BORNITIUS, EMBLEMATUM ETHICO-POLITICORUM (1662), reprinted in PIERRE LEGENDRE, L’EMPIRE DE LA VÉRITÉ fig. 3 (1983).
69
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threatening manner. The spectral heart is a defense of the city, the visceral sign
of the law, which the terrestrial walls, towers, and spires equally protect. There
is no need to prolong the analysis, in that the notion of the image of the heart is
well known to common lawyers who have since “time immemorial” adhered to
the maxim that it is the heart that does justice—corde creditur ad iustitiam in
the Latin vulgate. That then is the territory of the hymnological hermeneutics,
prayer, and interior abnegation and aspiration that Serroni spelled out as the
means of affectively capturing the heart for the law of God. Serroni is remarkably precise. The prepenultimate gloss, third from the end, offers a certain
poetic license in translating and interpreting Psalm 140: for the glory of your
name, Lord, give me a second life in your equity.71 In interpreting this plea,
Serroni emphasizes that grace is not law, indeed that life is not law but is rather
beyond it and in fulfillment of it. Thus it is not by right “or law of justice that I
can have [a life of grace], having achieved only your disgrace, but by a law of
beneficence which you have legislated for yourself, by a law founded solely on
your mercy.”72
Serroni offers the paradoxical notion of a law of charity, and uses the
image of a divinely self-imposed equity. There are numerous avenues of interpretation to follow here and they range from the paradox noted of a gratuitous
obligation, a voluntary necessity, to a beyond of law that is itself a non-normative, normative order, a law without law. It is important to note that this is not
a law of law, a regulating ideal or higher order of justice in some Hegelian
mode. It is literally a without, a heterotopia, a pure image. For the purposes of
post-critical legal hermeneutics, it is the space within which this non-law invisibly produces the manifestations that guide the administration (oikonomia) of
bodies and relations. This before the law of grace, Gabel’s “whirling dance” of
social and ethical connection exists, if it exists, in this space outside of law, in
the viscera of friendship, trust, and hope. Call it love or laughter, after the
Rabbi has stipulated the paradox that “the God that we do not believe in does
not exist.”73
Last words, final image. If the object of glory in Agamben’s account is
the empty throne, the self-governing world, then the subject that acclaims and
lauds that splendor vacui is constituted according to an apprehension or, let us
say, visual hermeneutics of images. The ius imaginum, the law of images was
a doctrine and notation of celebrity, a listing if you will of the dramatis personae of the public or, here, the intimate public sphere. What then holds a
person to a polity? What affectively maintains the juridical or post-critical
legal soul? For common lawyers the answer is, at least historically, an unwritten law. That of course has a seemingly unremarkable meaning, namely a law
that is based upon practice and use, patterns of conduct, and the Psalms. But
this unwritten law, dies sine linea, is also apprehensible as an outside of law, a
realm of images, of condensations and displacements that gain their effect
through their aesthetic and affective properties. What is it to find and declare
an unwritten law? At one level it is to resurrect a precedent, to cite to a text, to
71 SERRONI, supra note 11, at 129. The Latin reads somewhat differently: Propter nomen
tuum Domine vivificabis me, in aequitate tua.
72 Id. at 30.
73 Gabel, supra note 1, at 522.
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a record, to a memory, but, as all lawyers know, it is also an interlinear and
supra-textual moment of invention, an entry into practice, and a poetic moment
of creation of judgment. There is no law here, only image, and the work of
legal invention that takes place outside of law. The unwritten law, the empty
tomb, is witness to a plethora of critical possibilities. It is here that the force of
law encounters the contours of affect, here that the text becomes an image, the
letter a figure, the body an enigma, and poetry law.

